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Abstract
A large body of literature suggests that households could save money by increasing the
level of energy efficiency of the energy-using durables they purchase – a so-called “energy ef-
ficiency gap”. High implicit discount rates estimated from purchases of energy-using durables
have generally been interpreted as evidence of such an energy efficiency gap. However, the
“discounting gap” between econometrically estimated discount rates and risk-adjusted market
interest rates commonly presented in the literature is caused by different factors not all of which
portray privately suboptimal purchase decisions by households. In particular, the discounting
gap overstates the size of an energy efficiency gap in the choice between efficient and inefficient
durables because of estimation and interpretation flaws. This article reviews the factors poten-
tially explaining the observation of a discounting gap in the purchase of energy-using durables.
It separates the factors only contributing to a discounting gap from the ones causing an energy
efficiency gap to reveal a discrepancy between the size of the estimated discounting gap and
the empirical findings of privately inefficient behavior by households.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, production and consumption of energy yields negative externalities, such as
climate change, nuclear disasters, or dependencies on fuel imports. The reduction of energy con-
sumption is therefore a widespread policy goal. One possibility to achieve this goal without reducing
utility from energy consumption is to increase the energy efficiency of energy-using durables in pri-
vate households. Energy-using durables are defined as manufactured products, such as automobiles
or household appliances, that can be used over a relatively long period.
From an economic perspective, the purchase decision for an energy-using durable is typically
characterized by a trade-off between initial capital costs and long-term operating costs, as efficient
products usually have higher capital costs and lower operating costs than inefficient products.1
The purchase of an efficient product instead of an inefficient alternative providing the same level
of energy service can thus be considered an investment in energy efficiency: Higher expenses today
generate financial rents in the future in the form of lower energy costs. Broadly speaking, a purchase
decision by a utility-maximizing household is economically optimal when total costs, i.e. capital
costs plus lifetime operating costs, are minimized subject to an equivalent level of energy service
provided. Wilson and Dowlatabadi (2007) explain such utility-based decision models and their
importance in residential energy decisions. This article draws on their description of “rational” and
“irrational” behavior: Rational actors have preferences over financial and non-financial outcomes
that are ordered, known, invariant, and consistent. They seek to maximize expected utility, which is
a construct that measures the preferences expressed for different outcomes occurring with a certain
(or uncertain) probability. Individual choices violating one or more of the axioms of preferences on
which expected utility theory is based are considered as irrational in normative terms.
Following Gerarden et al. (2015b), I provide a deliberately simple version of a cost-minimizing
purchase decision for a household i in order to highlight the main features of the issue:
min Total Cost︸ ︷︷ ︸
objective
= K(E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equipment purchase cost
+ Oi(ei(E), pi) × Di(ri, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted operating costs
+ other costs (1)
The purchase cost K for any appliance is a function of the energy efficiency E of the appliance,
where E denotes a normalized measure of energy input required to obtain a given energy service.
1The terms “efficient” and “inefficient” are used to describe the relative difference in energy efficiency between
different appliances of the same product category.
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A higher level of energy efficiency E denotes lower energy input needed to obtain the same level of
energy service. Since the technological progress inherent in products with higher energy efficiency
is costly, K is generally increasing in E, i.e. efficient products are usually characterized by higher
purchasing costs K(E). Operating costs Oi are a function of annual energy use ei and energy
price pe,i. Annual energy use ei is decreasing with the degree of energy efficiency E of a product.
The discount factor Di is a function of the discount rate ri and the relevant time horizon T ,
i.e. the lifetime of the product. The term “other costs” subsumes other possible costs related to
the purchase of an energy-using durable, such as the opportunity costs of adoption (e.g. search
costs, implementation costs, etc.) or differences between efficient and inefficient products in the
(perceived) quality of energy service provided.
Households commonly appear to refrain from investing in more energy-efficient durables, even
if such investments would result in net monetary savings and thus be privately economically opti-
mal (Chandler and Brown, 2009; EPRI, 2009; Granade et al., 2009; McKinsey & Company, 2009;
National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Rosenfeld et al., 1993). In these cases, the present discounted
value of future energy savings would exceed the higher upfront costs of investments in efficient
equipment and appliances at current energy costs. Granade et al. (2009) estimate that the United
States could reduce annual energy consumption by 23 percent by deploying an array of financially
profitable energy efficiency measures, with the residential sector accounting for 35 percent of the
end-use efficiency potential. The observation that households do not make all privately optimal
investments in energy efficiency has led to the term “energy efficiency gap” (Hirst and Brown,
1990). By refraining from purchasing energy-using durables of higher energy efficiency, households
seem to incur unnecessarily high total costs over the product lifetime – i.e. they fail to minimize
total costs in Equation (1) (Howarth and Stanstad, 1995). The energy efficiency gap in purchases
of energy-using durables is viewed as a purely economical, utility-based concept in this article: A
rational, utility-maximizing household i is expected to minimize total costs according to Equation
(1) in a choice of energy-using durables with different levels of energy efficiency E, leading to the
privately optimal level of energy efficiency E∗. Any E < E∗ is not utility-maximizing, economi-
cally speaking irrational, and corresponds to an energy efficiency gap, because it entails excessive
lifetime energy costs. Using the terminology of Jaffe et al. (2004), this corresponds to the notion
of the “Economists’ narrow optimum” for the energy efficiency gap, as it is confined to individual
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decision-makers and does not consider the broader social perspective.2 This perspective is in line 
with a large share of the literature considering an energy efficiency gap in the choice of an inefficient 
appliance as opposed to the choice of an alternative, efficient appliance providing similar energy 
services. A different aspect of the energy efficiency gap not elaborated in this article is the timing of 
the purchase decision of an energy-using durable, i.e. at what point an aging, inefficient appliance is 
replaced.
Energy efficiency policy to reach the economists’ narrow optimum benefits f rom a  “win-win” 
argument: saving money for households who otherwise fail to minimize total costs by underinvesting 
in energy efficiency (i.e. an energy efficiency gap) and reducing externalities from energy use (Allcott 
and Greenstone, 2012). For energy policy purposes, it is of peculiar interest to locate this narrow 
optimum and identify measures to encourage its achievement. Potential policy measures to increase 
the level of energy efficiency beyond this point towards the social optimum leave the “win-win” 
territory, as they might be detrimental to the utility of some households. This raises the barrier for 
their political enforcement even though they could be legitimated by general welfare gains.
A common method to determine whether households reach the economists’ narrow optimum of 
energy efficiency has been to examine the discount rates applied in the trade-off between equip-
ment purchase costs and operating costs, using discrete choice models. For a utility-maximizing 
household acting according to Equation (1), it is possible to estimate implicit discount rates ϑ by 
applying revealed preference methods on actual purchase data of energy-using durables (Samuelson, 
1938). The rate of time discounting implicitly applied by a consumer who is indifferent between 
an inefficient product L (with low purchase cost KL and high operating costs OL) and an efficient 
product H (with high purchase cost KH and low operating costs OH) is called the “implicit discount 
rate” ϑ. Epper et al. (2011) provide a simple stylized example of the method to estimate implicit 
discount rates (p.2): Suppose a consumer is indifferent between two products, an efficient product 
H with a purchase price pH and running costs cH , all accruing in t = 1, and an inefficient product 
L with price pL and running costs cL with pH > pL and cH < cL. Assuming linear utility and 
equating the present value of total costs pH + cHexp(−ϑ) = pL + cLexp(−ϑ) yields and implicit 
discount rate of ϑ = −ln pH −pL . Higher discount rates make the efficient product H less preferable,
2This is in contrast to a recent working paper by Gerarden et al. (2015a) who instead use the term “energy
efficiency paradox” for the narrow optimum. They use the broader concept of social optimality to define the energy
efficiency gap.
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as the lifetime energy cost savings are discounted more heavily and thus carry a lower weight. High
discount rates could thus be the cause for a low frequency of purchases of the efficient product H,
and hence for an energy efficiency gap. I use the term “discounting gap” for implicit discount rates
ϑ deviating from a market return available on investments with similar risks rm: discounting gap
= ϑ−rm. From an economic perspective, it is not rational for households to require a different rate
of return for purchases of energy-using durables than they could attain for other investment oppor-
tunities of similar risk. Since higher discount rates lead to lower investments in energy efficiency,
positive discounting gaps have commonly been interpreted as evidence of an energy efficiency gap
(Howarth and Stanstad, 1995; Train, 1985).
This article critically comments on the popular notion to take a discounting gap as evidence of
an energy efficiency gap by raising the following questions: Are the observed purchases of energy-
using durables used to estimate implicit discount rates a valid measure for the utility of outcomes?
Are the factors explaining a discounting gap also factors explaining an energy efficiency gap? In
other words, are the estimates of a discounting gap solely driven by economically non-optimal (i.e.
irrational), private utility-reducing behavior?
The article reviews the literature on the factors causing a discounting gap in the purchase of
energy-using durables and divides them into three categories: objective factors, subjective factors,
and confounding variables. Objective factors comprise classical market failures like imperfect in-
formation (e.g. with respect to the energy use of an appliance) or liquidity constraints and credit
rationing that are beyond the decision process of the household and limit the choice set in Equa-
tion (1). Subjective factors influencing the outcome of Equation (1) include: limited attention;
reference-dependence; hyperbolic time discounting; biased beliefs; decision heuristics; high rates of
time preferences; and subjective risk and uncertainty considerations. The confounding variables
subsume the “other costs” mentioned in Equation (1) that might contribute to a discounting gap
if they are unobserved or unaccounted for in the discrete choice model used to estimate implicit
discount rates. On the one hand, the objective factors and the subjective factors representing be-
havioral “anomalies” can lead households to make economically non-optimal, irrational purchase
decisions. Hence, these factors can lead to the estimation of high implicit discount rates that corre-
spond to an energy efficiency gap. On the other hand, high rates of time preferences, subjective risk
and uncertainty considerations, and the confounding variables are rationally considered by house-
holds in their purchase decisions. Therefore, these rational factors might lead to the estimation of
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a discounting gap which overstates the energy efficiency gap.
Empirical evidence of the particular factors causing a discounting gap reveals a discrepancy
between the claims of a sizeable energy efficiency gap – based on the estimates of a large discounting
gap – and the empirical findings of privately inefficient behavior by households. While the energy
efficiency gap in purchases of energy-using durables is likely smaller than commonly suggested,
convincing evidence of its existence persists. Eliminating an energy efficiency gap is a desirable
goal in order to reap the “win-win” benefits of energy efficiency improvements. The evidence of
the causes of inefficient behavior presented in this article is helpful for policy purposes in order to
design policy measures targeted at mitigating these causes.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on a
discounting gap in the purchase of energy-using durables and presents an overview of its potential
explanations. Section 3 elaborates on the explanations for a discounting gap that represent eco-
nomically non-optimal, irrational purchase decisions and are thus part of an energy efficiency gap.
Section 4 details the explanations of a discounting gap that are part of rational purchase decisions
and should therefore not enter the conversation of an energy efficiency gap under the notion of
the economists’ narrow optimum. Section 5 concludes and provides recommendations for future
research and for energy policy.
2 Origin of the Discounting Gap
The probably most complete review of empirical estimates of discount rates from many different
contexts is provided by Frederick et al. (2002). They show that observed discount rates tend to
be very high, often exceeding market interest rates by substantial margins, and vary considerably
across individuals and across studies. Furthermore, Frederick et al. (2002) document that discount
rates exhibit a magnitude effect, i.e. discount rates for small amounts tend to be much higher
than rates for large amounts. Finally, the observed discount rates are not constant but rather
decline with the time horizon, i.e. near-present events tend to get discounted much more heavily
than events in the remote future. This type of behavior has been labeled “hyperbolic discounting”
because the discount function has a hyperbolic form, reflecting declining discount rates over time.
Concerning consumer choices of energy-using durables, empirical estimates of implicit discount
rates date back to the seminal publication by Hausman (1979), who estimated households’ implicit
6
Table 1: Estimated product-specific implicit discount rates in the purchase of energy-using durables
p.a.
Category Implicit Discount Rate
Space heating 2% – 36%
Air conditioning 3% – 29%
Refrigerators 39% – 300%
Lighting 7% – 182%
Automobiles 2% – 45%
Thermal insulation 10% – 32%
Water heating 24% – 243%
Sources: DEFRA (2010), Frederick et al. (2002), Train (1985).
discount rates in observed purchases of air conditioners using a discrete choice model, which is an
application of utility theory. He found that individuals on average use a discount rate of about
30 percent in making the trade-off decision between the higher initial cost and lower expected
operating costs of an efficient product. A considerable number of studies followed the approach
used by Hausman (1979) and used discrete choice models to estimate the discount rates implicit in
various purchases of energy-using durables to determine whether households undervalue operating
costs when making these trade-offs. Train (1985) and DEFRA (2010) provide extensive reviews
of this literature on discount rates in consumers’ purchases of energy-using durables. Table 1
summarizes their collection of implicit discount rate estimates by product category.
Table 1 shows that there is a wide range of observed discount rates, differing significantly both
between and within product categories. The observed discount rates are for the most part consider-
ably higher than risk-adjusted market interest rates, suggesting the existence of a discounting gap.
Howarth (2004) for example assumes that investments in energy efficiency have risk characteristics
similar to those associated with typical private sector investments and thus favors the use of a 6%
discount rate.3 Subtracting 6% from the estimates of implicit discount rates presented in Table 1
clearly leaves a positive residual – a discounting gap – in many cases. The discounting gap seems
to be particularly large for refrigerators with discount rates in the range of 39% to 300%, a range
3Similarly to the current situation, market interest rates in the US were also very low in 2003/2004 (Federal
Reserve, 2016).
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that can hardly be attributed to larger risk inherent in purchases of refrigerators as opposed to the 
other product categories.
The larger discount rates for refrigerators could partly be explained by the magnitude effect, 
as cost savings for efficient refrigerators compared to inefficient appliances are relatively small 
compared to high cost products as e.g. heating systems or cars (DEFRA, 2010). However, this 
explanation does not seem sufficient, as for example the discount rates estimated for water heaters, 
another high cost product, are also very high. In addition, the large variations of discount rate 
estimates within product categories suggest that some estimates might not be very reliable and are 
highly dependent on the method and context of elicitation.
The literature mentions different factors that potentially explain the empirical estimates of high 
discount rates, i.e. the observation of a discounting gap, in households’ purchases of energy-using 
durables. For the subsequent reasoning of this article, I divide these factors into three different 
categories: Objective factors determining the setting of the purchase decision, subjective factors 
representing the households’ particular decision processes, and variables confounding the empirical 
estimates of implicit discount rates because they are not considered in the choice model. Figure 1 
presents these three categories of factors and lists particular effects from each category as mentioned 
in the literature.
Figure 1 introduces an additional division of the factors explaining a discounting gap: the 
“irrational” factors on the left-hand side and the “rational” factors on the right-hand side. These 
two categories and their importance in explaining a discounting gap and an energy efficiency gap, 
respectively, are elaborated on in the following two sections.
3 Explaining the Discounting Gap – “Irrational” Factors
The irrational factors potentially cause households to make purchase decisions whose outcome is not 
in their best self-interest, i.e. it does not maximize their experienced utility. The economically sub-
optimal outcome could arise from objective factors determining the setting of the purchase decision 
as well as from the particular behavioral decision-making in the purchase of energy-using durables. 
If these factors cause households to purchase durables with lower energy efficiency than economi-
cally optimal, empirical estimates of implicit discount rates will produce a positive discounting gap, 
in this case equivalent to an energy efficiency gap. If these were the lone factors responsible for
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Figure 1: Factors explaining a discounting gap. Objective factors and behavioral anomalies can
cause privately non-optimal purchase decisions, i.e. an energy efficiency gap (left-hand side), while
specific preferences and confounding variables could explain the existing estimates of a discounting
gap without indicating non-optimal purchases by households (right-hand side).
the estimation of a discounting gap, the observation of a discounting gap would portray one-to-one
evidence of an energy efficiency gap and call for policy measures trying to minimize this gap. In
this section, I review the current state of the literature on these factors in the context of purchases
of energy-using durables.
3.1 Objective Factors
Objective factors are exogenous determinants of the setting of the purchase decision which can
prevent households from making privately optimal decisions. In economics, market failures are a
prime example for objective factors leading to restrictions or distortions of the choice set.4 I elabo-
4Market failures are given when the incentive structure in a given market does not encourage an economically
optimal allocation of resources.
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rate on the market failures mentioned in the literature to be relevant in the context of households 
purchasing energy-using durables: Imperfect information and liquidity constraints and credit ra-
tioning. If these factors keep households from reaching their optimal level of energy efficiency in 
the purchase of energy-using durables, then they explain a discounting gap as well as an energy 
efficiency gap. For a broader depiction of market failures in the energy efficiency context, see Con-
very (2011), Brown (2004), Jaffe et al. (2004), or Levine (1995). Brown (2004) for example also 
mention misplaced incentives as a source of market failure, with the landlord-tenant problem as 
the most popular example. Since these problems occur when an “intermediary” has the authority 
to act on behalf of a consumer, they are of no help to explain the discounting gap in households’ 
private purchase decisions.
3.1.1 Imperfect Information
Information about the energy efficiency of products is often incomplete, unavailable and difficult 
or costly to obtain (Brown, 2004). Since energy efficiency is not visible, it is often difficult for the 
consumer to obtain information about energy efficiency prior to purchasing a product. Additionally, 
it is also tedious to verify the performance of the product after the purchase since energy efficiency is 
not readily observable. If consumers are imperfectly informed about energy efficiency characteristics 
and the potential energy cost savings provided by efficient equipment, energy efficiency investment 
will be inefficiently low.
Brown (2004) uses the example of the vehicle market where fuel economy is bundled with many 
other attributes and the consumer is unable to compare two otherwise identical offers solely on the 
base of different energy efficiency characteristics. In fact, fuel economy is mechanically correlated 
with weight and horsepower and, in consequence, even highly negatively correlated with price 
(Allcott and Wozny, 2014). Hence, imperfect information is likely to particularly affect purchases of 
products with a large number of attributes in various forms, such as cars or televisions.
There are only few studies trying to disentangle the effects of information provision from other 
explanations of consumer behavior. In an artefactual, computer-based field e xperiment, Allcott 
and Taubinsky (2015) assess the effect of an information treatment (they provide information on 
differences in lifetime and total electricity costs) on the purchase of efficient compact fluorescent 
light bulbs as opposed to inefficient incandescent light bulbs. While they find a  p ositive effect of 
the information intervention on the purchase of the energy-efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs,
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both of their experiments show that large shares of consumers still prefer incandescent light bulbs
even after being powerfully informed. Similarly, Min et al. (2014) find that providing estimated
annual cost information of light bulbs to consumers led to a significant reduction in their implicit
discount rates, but they were still around 100%. These results can either be explained by highly
irrational decision-making, or by accepting that other factors besides total costs enter the objective
function of households, which is addressed in section 4.2 of this article.
Other studies focus on the effect of information provision provided by energy labels, which are a
popular instrument for government and private labeling programs to fill a potential information gap.
Newell and Siikamäki (2014) assess the relative importance of various elements of information labels
in a stated choice experiment. They find that providing simple information on the economic value
of saving energy was most effective in guiding households towards more cost-efficient investments
in energy efficiency. Stadelmann and Schubert (2017) show that presenting an energy label guides
households towards purchasing efficient appliances, with the most effective information format
differing between product categories. In particular, monetary and lifetime information is promising
for classes of goods with high absolute electricity costs, such as tumble dryers and freezers, but not
so much for classes of goods with low absolute electricity costs like vacuum cleaners (Stadelmann
and Schubert, 2017). Concerning the welfare effects of the Energy Star certification program,
Houde (2014) finds that consumers rely heavily on the certification, indicating that the label indeed
provides new information that influences consumers’ purchase decisions. He even ascertains that
some consumers over-rely on the presence of the binary Energy Star label and instead neglect other
important information like actual energy savings. With respect to the fuel economy label, Camilleri
and Larrick (2014) find that preference for fuel-efficient vehicles is highest when fuel-efficiency
information is communicated in terms of cost over an expanded, lifetime scale. Ungemach et al. (in
press) extend this result with their finding that translated attributes, i.e. expressions highlighting a
different aspect of the same attribute (e.g. car fuel economy can be expressed as fuel consumption
in miles, fuel cost in dollars, or tons of greenhouse gases emitted), can serve as decision “signposts”
because they (1) activate otherwise dormant objectives, such as pro-environmental values and goals,
and (2) direct the person towards the option that best achieves the activated objective.
Other studies on the impact of energy efficiency labels show mixed results (see Rohling and
Schubert, 2013 and Wiel and McMahon, 2005 for overviews of the literature on energy efficiency
labels). While some studies indicate that energy efficiency labels might have a positive impact to
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reduce imperfect information, other studies found no significant e ffect. This might partly b e due 
to the fact that even when labels are available, it can still be costly to acquire information, both 
because labels are incomplete and sometimes biased (Sallee, 2014). Energy labels can be expected to 
be most useful to reduce the uncertainty about an appliance’s energy use for product categories with 
little heterogeneity in usage patterns, such as refrigerators and freezers. They need to be designed 
very carefully in order to reduce the effect of imperfect information and maximize the amount of 
information conveyed at minimum effort cost for households, which is important for policy purposes. 
If the costs to acquire and process information are too high, which applies more to products with 
large heterogeneity in usage patterns (e.g. televisions, washing machines, etc.) or little information at 
the point of purchase (e.g. windows, doors, etc.) it might be rational for the household to be 
inattentive to energy efficiency in the purchase decision (see e.g. Gabaix, 2014 and Sallee, 2014 for 
models of rational inattention and costly thinking).
In sum, the existing empirical studies testing the effect of information provision on households’ 
purchases of energy-using durables provide evidence for a small to modest effect of information 
provision when delivered in the proper metric and scale, but other factors seem to restrain purchases 
of efficient durables as well.
3.1.2 Liquidity constraints and credit rationing
Purchases of an efficient durable instead of an inefficient product usually evoke higher upfront costs 
and lower future energy costs. If the difference in upfront costs is large (i.e. for high cost products 
such as cars, heating systems, etc.), liquidity constraints and credit rationing could prevent some 
households from purchasing the efficient product (Golove and Eto, 1996). Even if households 
intended to minimize total costs in their purchase decision as in Equation (1), the financial means 
needed for the purchase of the optimal appliance could be prohibitively high, leading to the purchase 
of a cheaper, inefficient product. Liquidity constraints and credit rationing are thus typical examples 
of a market failure which can lead to an energy efficiency gap by hindering some consumers from 
making privately optimal purchase decisions for high cost products. In estimates of implicit discount 
rates, the lack of purchases of efficient products because of liquidity constraints makes it seem as if 
future energy savings were extensively discounted, leading to the observation of a discounting gap. In 
a lab experiment, Epper et al. (2011) find that liquidity constraints are an important factor affecting 
households’ general discounting behavior. They estimate that discount rates for liquidity-
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constrained consumers in a temporal financial trade-off are a staggering 40% higher than for uncon-
strained individuals, thus explaining part of the extent of estimated discount rates. However, I am
not aware of any empirical evidence of the influence of liquidity constraints on estimated discount
rates in the purchase of energy-using durables.
Limited access to credit may be caused by asymmetric information on credit risk, which impedes
the distinction of borrowers with good credit risk from those with bad credit risk (Gillingham and
Palmer, 2014). It will be particularly difficult for low-income consumers with large credit risk to
borrow funds. At the limit, a credit-constrained household faces an essentially infinite discount rate
for investments in energy efficiency (Brown, 2004). Allcott and Greenstone (2012) state that while
credit constraints are a frequently discussed issue in theory, there is not much empirical evidence
in the context of energy efficiency.
From a policy perspective, the influence of liquidity constraints could be mitigated with financial
incentives, particularly with loan subsidies, which seem to have a larger impact than rebates (Wilson
and Dowlatabadi, 2007). A more general point raised by Gillingham et al. (2009) is that if liquidity
constraints are an issue for energy efficiency investments, then they will also constrain other types of
profitable investments, and any potential solution would have to reach well beyond energy efficiency
policy.
The importance of liquidity constraints in purchases of energy-using durables will always be
confined to the subgroup of households with severe liquidity constraints. For purchases of many
types of energy-using durables, this subgroup is rather small in industrial countries, given the
relatively small difference in purchase price between efficient and inefficient products (e.g. light
bulbs, air conditioners, refrigerators, etc.). Heating systems could represent an important exception
with respect to the price difference between efficient and inefficient appliances, which makes them
a promising category for future research on the relevance of liquidity constraints for an energy
efficiency gap.
3.2 Behavioral “anomalies”
Households have been observed to systematically deviate from utility-maximization theory in their
decision-making, especially when information and choice sets are complex (Wilson and Dowlatabadi,
2007). The different types of deviations from rational choice have been compiled under the term
behavioral “anomalies” (see e.g. Thaler, 1989, 1988, 1987). Behavioral “anomalies” can lead house-
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holds to decisions that are objectively not optimal in their outcome, i.e. they lead to differences 
between decision utility and experienced utility (Kahneman et al., 1997). If behavioral “anomalies” 
consistently lead households to purchase durables with lower energy efficiency than optimal, such 
behavior would explain the observation of a discounting gap corresponding to an energy efficiency 
gap. Hence, behavioral “anomalies” are located in the left half of Figure 1, which is consistent with 
the recent literature widely citing these factors as a potential explanation for the existence of an 
energy efficiency gap (see e.g. Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Baddeley, 2011; Greene, 2011; Helfand 
and Wolverton, 2011; Gillingham et al., 2009; Shogren and Taylor, 2008).
3.2.1 Limited attention
In order to simplify complex decisions, consumers process only a subset of the available information 
and systematically underweight certain information. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze pricing 
with boundedly rational consumers who do not pay attention to hidden features of product prices. 
There is a wide range of empirical findings confirming that consumers are inattentive to  ancillary 
product costs that are less salient or obvious such as shipping and handling charges (Hossain and 
Morgan, 2006), sales taxes (Chetty et al., 2009), or out-of-pocket insurance costs (Abaluck and 
Gruber, 2011).
In the context of energy-using durables, the “shrouded” price attribute is the running energy 
cost while the initial purchase price is much more salient. Actual energy use is not observable since 
the (monthly or yearly) electricity bills generally provide no breakdown of individual end-uses. As 
a result, households tend to base their purchase decisions for energy-using durables less on energy 
efficiency and more on other, more visible aspects of the product, such as the initial purchase 
price (O’Malley et al., 2003). When buying energy-using durables, households might thus be more 
attentive to the purchase price than to the running energy costs, leading to a higher weight of the 
former in purchase decisions. The inattention to energy costs is especially pronounced if they are less 
salient (e.g. for constantly running appliances such as refrigerators or wireless routers) or if they are 
small compared to the purchase price, as for example for refrigerators or washing machines (Hossain 
and Morgan, 2006). Due to inattention, households are less likely to purchase an efficient product, 
which commonly entails a higher purchase price and lower running energy costs than an inefficient 
alternative. This effect has been widely suggested in the theoretical literature as an important driver 
of an energy efficiency gap (see e.g. Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sanstad and
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Howarth, 1994; Anderson and Claxton, 1982; Blumstein et al., 1980).
Empirically, it is very difficult to distinguish inattention from incomplete information. One
possibility is to study inattention to energy efficiency with experimental manipulations of salience.
In a field experiment on light bulb choice, Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) try to disentangle how
much the energy cost information treatment affected choices through increased attention versus
updated beliefs. They suggest that both factors contribute to the treatment effect, maintaining
that limited attention is a relevant factor in keeping households from buying compact fluorescent
light bulbs. Stadelmann and Schubert (2017) find that the presence of a monetary energy label
did not drastically improve knowledge of the appliance’s energy costs, hinting the identified impact
of the energy label might have been mainly driven by increased attention. Complementary use of
experimental and non-experimental techniques in future research would help to isolate the effect of
increasing salience of energy costs on purchase decisions of energy-using durables.
Concerning energy policy, it is usually recommended to address the cause of the inefficient out-
come as directly as possible (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). However, it does not seem realistic that
households’ limited attention can be eliminated entirely by policy measures such as energy labels or
other instruments of information provision. If households are accepted to partially be inattentive to
energy consumption, recent research has shown that the optimal policy is a combination of energy
tax, subsidies for high-efficiency products, and energy efficiency standards (Allcott et al., 2014;
Tsvetanov and Segerson, 2014, 2013).
3.2.2 Reference-dependent preferences
Markowitz (1952) was the first to suggest that people hold reference-dependent preferences, a notion
adopted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their famous paper on prospect theory. Prospect
theory accounts for several departures from expected utility theory by claiming that people evaluate
outcomes based on changes with respect to a reference point and not with respect to the final overall
wealth. As an additional deviation from expected utility theory, the utility function in prospect
theory is steeper in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This means that a loss with respect to
the reference point results in a larger decline in utility than a gain of equal size increases utility – an
effect called “loss aversion” (Kahneman et al., 1991). This model of reference-dependent preferences
with loss aversion has since been used by many economists and has found empirical support (see
DellaVigna, 2009 for an overview).
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Concerning the issue of energy-using durables, Greene (2011) asserts that loss aversion could 
be a factor hindering household investment in energy efficiency and thus causing part of an energy 
efficiency gap. Since there is some uncertainty with respect to future energy cost differences between 
an efficient and an inefficient durable, e.g. because of the way the product is used or because of 
future changes in energy prices, there is a chance that the choice of an efficient product proves not 
to be profitable in h indsight. The mere possibility of such a  l oss f rom the purchase decision could 
prevent loss averse households from purchasing an efficient product (Greene, 2011). For example, 
Greene et al. (2009) find t hat t he t ypical c onsumer w ould d ecline a n i ncrease i n p assenger car 
fuel economy from 28 to 35 MPG since the expected value of the investment is negative for the 
typical loss-averse consumer. Reference-dependent preferences with loss aversion can therefore lead 
to choices that fail to maximize experienced utility: The fear of the small probability of a (utility) 
loss with respect to the reference point hinders households from making investments with a large 
probability of a (utility) gain. Another issue is raised by Turrentine and Kurani (2007), who find that 
when consumers buy a vehicle, they do not have the basic building blocks of knowledge assumed by 
the model of economically rational decision-making, and they make large errors estimating gasoline 
costs and savings over time.
I am not aware of any other studies with other product categories empirically examining the 
impact of loss aversion on purchases of efficient durables. In general, this issue can be expected to 
compound with increasing product lifetime and hence be relevant for heating systems and water 
heaters. For appliances running on electricity instead of fuel, I would expect this factor to be less 
of an issue, as electricity prices are less volatile than fuel prices, which reduces the probability 
that the purchase of an efficient product proves not to be profitable in hindsight. On the other 
hand, households might not be aware of the lower volatility of electricity prices or be (even) less 
knowledgeable with respect to the energy consumption of other product categories, which could 
increase the uncertainty with respect to future energy cost savings of an efficient product and make 
it less attractive for a loss averse household.
From a policy perspective, financial incentives for the purchase of efficient products could further 
reduce the probability of a loss with respect to the reference point in order to lower the barrier 
for loss averse households to purchase an efficient appliance. Other measures could be targeted at 
reducing the uncertainty with respect to future energy cost savings, e.g. by insuring households 
making an investment in energy efficiency against any potential losses, as suggested by Mills (2003).
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3.2.3 Hyperbolic time discounting
A robust finding i n t he e xperimental l iterature o n r isk t aking i s t he f act t hat p eople b ehave as 
if they distort objectively given probabilities in a systematic way: Broadly speaking, they tend 
to overweight small probabilities and extreme outcomes and underweight large probabilities and 
intermediate outcomes (see Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012, for an overview on probability weight-
ing). Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) show that people prone to such non-linear probability weighting 
exhibit hyperbolic discount rates, i.e. declining discount rates over time. Another possible explana-
tion for hyperbolic time discounting is provided by models of reduced self-control and temptation, 
stating that households are tempted to maximize current utility and incur disutility (i.e. self-control 
costs) if they resist temptation (see e.g. Tsvetanov and Segerson, 2013 and Gul and Pesendorfer, 
2001).
The declining of discount rates over time often leads to time inconsistent choices because house-
holds have different preference orderings at different points in time, which violates the axioms of 
expected utility theory (Frederick et al., 2002; Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).5 Time 
inconsistent choices fail to maximize experienced utility and can thus potentially explain part of an 
energy efficiency gap (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005).
With respect to the purchase of energy-using durables, hyperbolic time discounting implies 
that the difference in purchase price (immediate costs) between efficient and inefficient products 
carries more weight than the difference in future energy costs (delayed benefits), which decreases the 
attractiveness of the efficient product, particularly for product categories with long (expected) 
product lifetimes. I am not aware of any empirical studies particularly focusing on hyperbolic 
discounting in the purchase of energy-using durables. This could be explained by the character 
of most energy-using durables, which are generally not assumed to be high on a temptation scale 
and are purchased rather infrequently. Furthermore, some recent studies find l ittle e vidence of 
non-exponential discounting behavior, highlighting a more general need for further research of 
households’ discounting behavior (Andersen et al., 2014; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012).
5Halevy (2015) inspects time inconsistent behavior in more detail. He distinguishes time consistency from sta-
tionarity and time invariance and finds t hat p resent-biased p references a re not n ecessarily t he main s ource o f time 
inconsistent choices.
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3.2.4 Biased beliefs
If households underestimate the potential cost savings of energy efficiency investments, they might 
be unwilling to undertake them. However, empirical evidence does not imply a systematic un-
derestimation of potential cost savings. Attari et al. (2014) find that in fact, consumers tend to 
underestimate energy use of large appliances, but overestimate the energy use of smaller ones. In 
a survey of households who just purchased a new household appliance, Stadelmann and Schubert 
(2017) find that households generally overestimate the electricity costs and thus also the potential 
cost savings of purchasing an efficient appliance, particularly for vacuum cleaners, which are char-
acterized by low absolute electricity costs. Hence, the underestimation of energy use seems to be 
at most an issue for large products with high energy consumption, if anything.
In an attempt to measure whether systematically biased beliefs contribute to an undervaluation 
of fuel economy, Allcott (2011) uses survey data to elicit consumer beliefs about future fuel savings 
from a higher fuel economy vehicle. He finds t hat c onsumers s uffer f rom “MPG i llusion” –  they 
underestimate the energy cost differences among low-MPG vehicles and overestimate the cost dif-
ferences among high-MPG vehicles. In a simulation eliminating this bias, Allcott (2013) ascertains 
that consumers would shift away from both high-MPG hybrids and low-MPG trucks and purchase 
more medium MPG vehicles. The aggregate effect of MPG illusion on the average MPG of vehicles 
sold remains ambiguous and does not explain a low demand for efficient products (Allcott, 2011).
Kahneman et al. (1982) provide an extensive list of ways in which judgment diverges from 
rationality. One example that could be relevant in the context of purchasing energy-using durables is 
the “law of small numbers”, which purports that people make inferences about general probabilities 
from small sample sizes. The law of small numbers could give way to a discounting gap by biasing 
households’ beliefs about the durability of products. If households assume a shorter lifetime than 
objectively accurate, the discount rates estimated in the decision model with objective lifetimes 
will be inflated and present a  d iscounting gap corresponding to an energy efficiency g ap. A  single 
bad experience with the durability of a product could – according to the law of small numbers –
induce households to generally belief that the lifetime of products is shorter than it veritably is.6
6Only an underestimation of product lifetime could be a cause of a discounting gap, which is why I use the 
example of a single bad experience. In principle, bad experiences and good experiences with product durability could 
cancel out in mean estimates of discount rates. However, Baumeister et al. (2001) show that bad events have greater 
power than good ones, which means that the effect of bad experiences with product durability can be expected to
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This effect can be extended to the general risk perception of households: A biased perception of
risk associated with the purchase of energy-using durables of different energy efficiency impacts the
estimated discount rates, but there is no empirical evidence that such a tendency adversely affects
efficient products.
I am not aware of any other empirical studies of the influence biased beliefs on the purchase
of energy-using durables. The existing evidence, while rather sparse, suggests that biased beliefs
are unlikely to be a significant driver of an energy efficiency gap. Hence, this factor does not merit
priority for energy policy.
3.2.5 Decision heuristics
When facing complex decision problems with many options, abundance of information, or complex
information, consumers have been found to use heuristics or so-called rules of thumb to simplify the
decision-making process. Decisions heuristics are thus difficult to separate from the above mentioned
effects of imperfect information and limited attention, since by definition, applying a heuristic means
to be inattentive to part of the information in the decision-making process. DellaVigna (2009) lists
the following examples, among others, where evidence in psychology suggests that individuals use
simplifying heuristics (p.353):
• Preference for the familiar – choosing the option that is more familiar as can be seen for
example in brand loyalty or investment in companies investors recognize from their home
state (see Huberman, 2001)
• Preference for the salient – choosing the option that is most salient as for example the first
candidate on a ballot (see Ho and Imai, 2008)
• Choice avoidance – avoiding choice altogether, possibly in favor of the default option (see e.g.
Iyengar and Lepper, 2000 for the choice of jam taste)
In the context of energy-using durables, applying decision heuristics as the ones mentioned
above could lead to a systematic bias of purchase decisions towards inefficient products: They have
been around longer and are thus more familiar, they are attractive with respect to the most salient
attribute purchase price and they represent the fallback option if choice is avoided altogether.
dominate, which makes an underestimation of lifetime more likely.
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The familiarity with energy-efficient products could be influenced by technological progress and the 
presence of energy labels for different product categories. In the EU for example, additional 
categories at the top of the energy efficiency scale were first introduced for cooling devices and 
inefficient appliances at the bottom of the energy efficiency scale were periodically banned, likely 
leading to higher familiarity with efficient appliances.
Empirically, Lacetera et al. (2012) as well as Turrentine and Kurani (2007) present evidence 
of decision heuristics used in purchases of cars, but they do not find e vidence t hat t he heuristics 
would systematically favor inefficient cars. With respect to energy labeling, several studies find that 
households confronted with the EU Energy Label employ decision heuristics, focusing primarily on 
energy efficiency classes while neglecting more detailed information on energy consumption (see e.g. 
Stadelmann and Schubert, 2017, Andor et al., 2016, Waechter et al., 2015a, Waechter et al., 2015b). 
In a hypothetical study, Waechter et al. (2015b) find that b ecause o f such decision heuristics, the 
EU Energy Label might even cause households to chose a higher-consuming, larger product because 
they ignore the fact that the energy efficiency rating is a grade of energy consumption relative to 
the size of a product. In a field e xperiment, Stadelmann and Schubert ( 2017) partly confirm this 
finding b y s howing t hat e nergy l abels w ith r elative i nformation o n e nergy c onsumption l ead to 
an increase in mean volume of purchased freezers. These findings i llustrate t hat p olicy measures 
such as energy labels need to be designed carefully and consider the decision heuristics used by 
households in order to prevent inadvertent (side) effects of the measure.
4 Explaining the Discounting Gap – “Rational” Factors
The right-hand side of Figure 1 displays potential factors explaining a discounting gap without 
portraying privately non-optimal, irrational behavior. Based on their time and risk preferences, 
households may deliberately use a larger discount rate than the market return on investments with 
similar risk. Furthermore, the estimates of implicit discount rates using discrete choice models – as 
presented in section 2 – can be confounded if the choice model does not consider all the relevant 
decision factors. Due to these factors, a discounting gap can come about despite purely ratio-
nal, utility-maximizing decision-making by households. A discounting gap based only on rational 
decisions does not correspond to an energy efficiency gap and hence would not legitimate policy 
interventions from an economic perspective.
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4.1 Specific preferences
Based on their specific preferences, households might deliberately use discount rates that are higher 
than objectively risk-adjusted market interest rates. While such behavior contributes to the obser-
vation of a discounting gap, it maximizes households private utility and is not causing an energy 
efficiency gap. Naturally, this issue is amplified for product categories with longer (expected) prod-
uct lifetimes, as the discount rate is applied to a longer time horizon and hence carries more weight.
4.1.1 High rates of time preferences
In economics, time preferences specifically refer to the preference for immediate utility over delayed 
utility (Frederick et al., 2002). Discounted utility theory assumes that the same rate of time 
preference applies to all forms of consumption, i.e. time preferences are not context-dependent 
(Frederick et al., 2002). Based on this assumption, Frederick et al. (2002) particularly distinguish 
between time preferences and time discounting, which broadly covers any reason for caring less 
about a future consequence, including uncertainty and changing tastes. This subsection is devoted 
specifically to individual t ime preferences.
The most direct and pure form to elicit time preferences is by varying the timing and the 
size of financial p ay o ffs. N ewell a nd S iikamäki ( 2015) e licited i ndividual d iscount r ates using 
a hypothetical choice between a $1’000 payment available in one month and a higher payment 
available in 12 months. They find s ubstantial h eterogeneity i n i ndividual d iscount r ates, w ith a 
mean rate of 19 percent, a median of 11 percent, and a standard deviation of 23 percent. Using 
similar methods in a representative nation-wide study in Switzerland, Enzler et al. (2014) find 
mean discount rates of 27 percent when excluding extreme values. In one of very few incentivized 
experimental studies, Epper et al. (2011) report subjective discount rates of approximately 30% p.a. 
In a comparison of experimental methods to measure time preferences, Andreoni et al. (2015) find 
even larger discount rates up to approximately 100% p.a. All of those recent estimates of discount 
rates are much higher than risk-adjusted market interest rates.
In terms of purchases of energy-using durables, households’ “pure” time preferences rationally 
influence the discount rate at which they personally discount future financial pay off s. If  households 
value present consumption relatively high compared to future consumption, securing a large level of 
present consumption maximizes their experienced utility. In the trade-off between an efficient and
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an inefficient durable, purchasing the inefficient product with the lower purchase price preserves a
higher level of present consumption possibilities. Hence, high rates of time preferences favor the
purchase of inefficient products and raise the barrier for the purchase of efficient products. If a
household prefers some amount of consumption now to the higher amount of consumption in the
future as achievable with a return equal to the risk-adjusted market interest rate7, it uses a higher
discount rate than the market for its privately optimal decision.8 This part of a discounting gap
reflects households’ pure time preferences and constitutes a rational, private optimization in the
purchase of an energy-using durable.
In sum, recent elicitations of time preferences indicate that part of the discounting gap in
purchases of energy-using durables can be ascribed to high rates of time preferences inherent in
households’ intertemporal trade-offs. Decision-making based on high rates of time preferences is
rational and thus not part of an energy efficiency gap.
4.1.2 Subjective risk and uncertainty consideration
The outcomes of investments in energy efficiency are uncertain due to various reasons, such as
uncertainty about energy prices, uncertainty about the performance and lifetime of a product, or
uncertainty about the real-world energy consumption of a product (Greene, 2011). The uncertainty
resolves only gradually over a long time period. Therefore, households’ risk and uncertainty pref-
erences play an important role in their purchase decisions for energy-using durables. Objective risk
of energy efficiency investments does not contribute to a discounting gap, as it is already consid-
ered in the risk-adjusted market interest rate deducted from the estimated implicit discount rates.
However, it is possible that based on their subjective risk preferences, households require a larger
risk premium, which would contribute to the observation of a discounting gap.
For households purchasing energy-using durables, it seems realistic to assume uncertainty with
respect to both the amount of energy the appliance will use as well as the costs of energy use based
7The risk-adjusted market interest rate corresponds to the price financial markets set for the trade-off of present
versus future consumption.
8I concede that it might not be realistic for rational discount rates to arbitrarily exceed market rates. If this was
the case, households with very high rates of time preference should always exhaust their credit limit as long as the
borrowing costs are lower than their time preferences and spend all their money immediately – unless risk preferences
limit such behavior.
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on future energy prices. Most evidence suggests that people are generally ambiguity9 averse (see
e.g. Wakker, 2010; Epstein, 1999; Camerer and Weber, 1992). Ambiguity averse households try
to reduce the level of uncertainty they are exposed to. In the context of energy-using durables,
ambiguity averse households can be expected to generally purchase appliances of higher energy
efficiency in order to reduce the uncertainty from future energy costs. Such behavior would lead to
estimates of lower implicit discount rates and therefore cannot explain either a discounting gap or
an energy efficiency gap. Along these lines, I cannot think of any other examples of how subjective
risk and uncertainty consideration would increase households’ privately rational discount rates,
while examples of irrational decision-making in the face of uncertainty have already been discussed
in section 3.2.
4.2 Confounding Variables
Besides the explanations presented above, modeling errors in the discrete choice models used to
estimate implicit discount rates in purchases of energy-using durables are likely contributing to the
observed discounting gap. Specifically, the decision models used by Hausman (1979) and others
infer utility of the outcomes from observed choices. They abstract from product attributes that
were not observed and from potential implementation barriers for the efficient products. If efficient
products have systematically worse unobserved characteristics than inefficient products, they will
rationally be purchased less frequently than predicted in a simpler model not accounting for these
factors. The omitted variables make it seem as if households strongly discounted future energy
cost savings achievable with the purchase of an efficient instead of an inefficient product, inflating
estimated discount rates. A misspecification of households’ utility functions can thus falsely lead
to the interpretation that households use irrationally high discount rates.
4.2.1 Lower (perceived) quality of efficient products
Products of varying energy efficiency levels differ from each other in ways that are often omitted in
decision models in the literature. Producers may generate efficiency improvements by trading off
other product attributes for enhanced energy efficiency. In that case, purchasing efficient products
may entail opportunity costs in the form of lower product quality compared to inefficient products.
9Ambiguity means uncertainty with respect to the true underlying probability.
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Howarth (2004) provides the example of car manufacturers achieving increased fuel economy by 
reducing the size and weight of new vehicles, reducing their crashworthiness and thus compromising 
on vehicle safety. Additionally, Allcott and Greenstone (2012) mention that efficient cars often have 
fewer luxury amenities than inefficient models. Not controlling for size, safety and households’ tastes 
for luxury amenities in the econometric analysis of car purchases leads to an upward bias in the 
estimation of implicit discount rates. This effect can lead to estimates of a discounting gap which 
is not indicative of an energy efficiency gap, as the observed product choice maximizes utility for 
households.
Light bulbs are another famous example for hidden costs of efficient products. Fluorescent 
light bulbs produce a different light spectrum than incandescent light bulbs, which some people 
perceive as “cold” and aesthetically inferior (Howarth, 2004). While both types of light bulbs may 
objectively provide the same energy service of lighting, the quality of the products is perceived 
differently by some people, leading to differences in utility. This example illustrates why it is not 
trivial to solve the problem of differences in perceived quality of products by including various 
product attributes in analyses of cross-sectional choice data. Observing and accurately measuring 
all product characteristics is often impractical, and households’ valuation of some attributes – as 
for example the preference for different light spectra – would have to be ascertained in separate 
economic experiments.
Examples for other product categories with lower perceived quality of efficient products could 
be if consumers expect the cleaning of energy-efficient dishwashers, washing machines, or vacuum 
cleaners to be inferior, but I am not aware of any empirical evidence of such perceptions.
One possibility to eliminate the problem of unobserved product attributes is to use differencing 
of fixed-effects models w ith p anel d ata. I n t he p urchase o f vehicles f or e xample, c onditioning on 
vehicle fixed effects sweeps out a ll observed and unobserved characteristics and a llows t o directly 
test whether relative prices for vehicles with different fuel economy ratings move one-for-one with 
changes in the present discounted value of fuel costs, which would be expected when all market 
participants are rational. Prices moving less than one-for-one would be a sign of consumers un-
dervaluing fuel costs, and hence of an energy efficiency gap. In recent studies using this method, 
Allcott and Wozny (2014) suggest that some investment inefficiencies are present, while Busse et al.
(2013) and Sallee et al. (2009) find no evidence of an energy efficiency g ap. Allcott and Greenstone 
(2012) state that even if there are in fact some investment inefficiencies in the automobile market,
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the welfare losses would be relatively small.
4.2.2 Adoption costs
Another type of opportunity costs associated with energy efficiency investments are adoption costs. 
Such costs can take many forms, including time spent finding or i nstalling a  more energy-efficient 
product (i.e. search costs) and unobserved implementation costs (Gerarden et al., 2015a). Howarth 
(2004) again uses light bulbs to provide an example for the latter: Compact fluorescent bulbs tend 
to be bigger and bulkier than the conventional incandescent light bulbs they replace. Therefore, 
they do not work well with certain lighting fixtures and are purchased less frequently.
Another example I can think of would be electric cars: While the total lifetime cost of an 
electric car might be lower than for a car with internal combustion engine, the usage of an electric 
car can entail significant adoption costs if the infrastructure of electric vehicle charging stations is 
not sufficient.
Ignoring possible incremental adoption costs of efficient products compared to inefficient prod-
ucts in the discrete choice model leads to inflated e stimates o f i mplicit d iscount r ates. Hence, 
adoption costs represent a confounding variable in many empirical estimates of implicit discount 
rates, adding to the size of the observed discounting gap. In principle, adoption costs could be 
incorporated in decision models, but in practice this is often inhibited by data and measurement 
challenges. Experimental and quasi-experimental research designs offer another possible avenue for 
quantifying these costs.
5 Conclusion
Since the 1970s, a large body of literature used an econometric approach to estimate the discount 
rates implicit in actual purchase decisions for energy-using durables. Estimates of discount rates 
considerably higher than risk-adjusted market interest rates – a discounting gap – have been in-
terpreted as evidence of an energy efficiency gap. In this article I challenge the assumption that 
high implicit discount rates estimated from observed choices are directly indicative of an energy 
efficiency gap.
The underlying issue for measuring an energy efficiency gap is to correctly quantify each vari-
able influencing individual d ecision-making. Conventional estimates as presented in section 2  rarely
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satisfy this condition, as they measure implicit discount rates without controlling for several con-
founding variables influencing households’ purchase decisions for energy-using durables. The litera-
ture particularly mentions the examples of cars and light bulbs to entail confounding variables, but 
other product categories are likely affected as well. The unobserved components – such as search 
costs, differences in product attributes, and differences in the valuation of attributes – are part of 
households’ utility functions and are thus rationally considered in a privately optimal decision. While 
augmenting the estimates of implicit discount rates, these factors do not explain an energy efficiency 
gap. The same can be said if high rates of time preferences and subjective risk and un-certainty 
considerations cause households to deliberately discount future monetary flows heavily, which 
particularly concerns product categories with long product lifetime. Therefore, the prevalent 
evidence of a discounting gap overstates the size of an energy efficiency gap.
On the other hand, market failures and behavioral anomalies explain a discounting gap as well as 
an energy efficiency gap. These factors cause some households to purchase an inefficient appliance 
even if the efficient product would be privately optimal, i.e. maximize their utility. Empirical 
evidence implies that imperfect information and limited attention are likely part of the problem in 
causing an energy efficiency gap. These factors particularly affect purchases of products with a large 
number of attributes in various forms, such as cars or televisions, and purchases of products with low 
salience of energy consumption or small energy costs compared to the purchase price, such as 
refrigerators or washing machines. Since much of the existing literature on the impact of these factors 
is based on hypothetical choice experiments, further empirical research, especially using large-scale 
evaluations and randomized controlled trials, is desirable to provide more thorough evidence of 
decision processes in households’ purchases of energy-using durables.
Gaining further insight into the causes of an energy efficiency gap is essential for policy purposes 
in order to design policy measures targeted at mitigating these causes. In the presence of imper-
fect information and limited attention, information strategies like energy labels could increase the 
economic efficiency of purchase decisions and households’ experienced utilities. However, it does 
not seem realistic that households’ limited attention can be eliminated entirely by policy measures 
such as energy labels or other instruments of information provision. If households are partially 
inattentive to energy consumption, the optimal policy complements information instruments with 
an energy tax, subsidies for high-efficiency products, and energy efficiency standards (Allcott et al., 
2014; Tsvetanov and Segerson, 2014, 2013). Closing an eventual energy efficiency gap presents a
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win-win opportunity: It increases households’ private welfare by leading them to economically op-
timal decisions and it raises societal welfare by reducing the negative externalities inherent in the
production and consumption of energy.
Even if there is no energy efficiency gap in the economic definition used in this article, in-
creasing the energy efficiency of energy-using durables could be socially desirable as long as energy
consumption causes negative externalities. However, measures to increase energy efficiency levels
beyond the economists’ narrow optimum cannot appeal to the “win-win” argument, as they might
not be privately optimal for all households. Policy measures interfering with deliberate decisions
based on households’ preferences ought to be legitimated with overall welfare benefits and are only
economically desirable if they pass a benefit-cost analysis.
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